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Abstract
The way words are used in natural language can influence how the same words
are understood by students in formal educational contexts. Here we argue that this
so-called semantic contamination effect plays a role in determining how students
engage with mathematical proof, a fundamental aspect of learning mathematics.
Analyses of responses to argument evaluation tasks suggest that students may hold
two different and contradictory conceptions of proof: one related to conviction, and
one to validity. We demonstrate that these two conceptions can be preferentially
elicited by making apparently irrelevant linguistic changes to task instructions. After
analyzing the occurrence of “proof” and “prove” in natural language, we report
two experiments that suggest that the noun form privileges evaluations related to
validity, and that the verb form privileges evaluations related to conviction. In short,
we show that (what is judged to be) a non-proof can sometimes (be judged to) prove.
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Argumentation and proof are widely accepted as being central to mathematics
(Heinze and Reiss, 2007; Hilbert et al., 2008). Not surprisingly then, educa-
tors generally agree that argumentation and proof should be incorporated
into mathematics learning and instruction at all levels (Hanna, 2007; Schoen-
feld, 1994). However, many studies have shown that students find engaging
with proof difficult, regardless of whether such engagement takes the form of
evaluating given proofs or constructing novel proofs (Coe and Ruthven, 1994;
Fischbein, 1982; Harel and Sowder, 1998; Knuth, 2002; Selden and Selden,
2003). There is a long tradition in the literature of trying to account for these
difficulties by looking at individual students’ conceptions of proof, and finding
1 We are grateful to James Adelman, David Pimm, Keith Weber, and an anonymous
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mismatches between these and the agreed standards in the discipline (Bell,
1976; Healy and Hoyles, 2000; Segal, 1999). Our goal in this paper is to build
on this long research tradition, but also to attempt to connect it to a rather
different and under-researched area: the linguistics of mathematical proof. We
first discuss some theoretical background issues associated with both these
areas.
1 Semantic contamination.
The influence of language on the learning has been widely recognized in the
education literature. It is now accepted that the way linguistic structures
are used in natural language (by which we mean language from day-to-day
life) can differ from how the same linguistic structures are used in formal
contexts and, in particular, in mathematics. When analyzing this phenomena,
Halliday (1975) used the term “register” to refer to “a set of meanings that
is appropriate to a particular function of language, together with the words
and structures which express those meanings” (p. 65). Halliday suggested that
the mathematical register is relatively unusual for a technical register, in that
when naming new phenomena, it often redefines simple words from natural
language rather than coining novel technical terminology. This can give rise
to what Pimm (1987) called semantic contamination: where the meaning or
usage of a term from natural language influences how the term is understood
by a learner in the mathematical register.
Several examples of semantic contamination have been discussed in the math-
ematics education literature. In the context of advanced mathematics for ex-
ample, Monaghan (1991) found that the natural language meaning of words
and phrases associated with the limit concept (“tends to”, “approaches”, “con-
verges”, etc.) can impact upon students’ concept images of the formal limit
concept in calculus and analysis classes. Similarly, Tall and Vinner (1981) sug-
gested that colloquial meanings of the term “continuity” influence how stu-
dents engage with the formal mathematical concept. Difficulties which arise
from such issues will need to be overcome if the learner is to successfully engage
with the mathematical register (Pimm, 1987; Schleppegrell, 2007).
In this paper we explore whether students’ understanding of mathematical
proof is influenced by semantic contamination. In other words, we ask does the
way that words associated with proof are used in natural language influence
how they are understood in the mathematical register?
To establish semantic contamination three steps are required. The first is to in-
vestigate the way in which the to-be-analyzed concept is referred to in natural
language. In the case of limit discussed by Monaghan (1991), for example, the
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natural language use and meanings of the terms “limit”, “approaches”, “tends
to” and so on were investigated. The second step is to empirically examine
how these concepts are understood by students in mathematical contexts:
Monaghan conducted a survey which interrogated students’ interpretations of
these terms. The third and final step is to argue that the results from the anal-
yses conducted in the first two stages correspond sufficiently to suggest that
natural language referents to the concept influences students’ understanding
of the concept in mathematical contexts.
We begin this three step process by analyzing the contexts in which the concept
of proof appears in natural language.
2 Proof in natural language.
In the English language there are two main linguistic methods of referring to
the concept of proof: it can appear as a noun (“proof”) or as a verb (“prove”).
To investigate the way that these noun and verb forms are used in natural
language, we searched for instances of the noun form (“proof” or “proofs”) and
the verb form (“prove” and “proves”) in the British National Corpus (BNC)
World Edition (Burnard, 2000). The BNC is a comprehensive collection of 100
million words of spoken and written English, designed to represent a cross-
section of current English usage. Analyses of large scale corpora, such as the
BNC, are widely used by researchers interested in the usage patterns of various
linguistic features. In particular, such techniques have been highly productive
at comparing the use of words in different registers (Stubbs, 2004).
Our aim was to determine the frequency of the verb and noun referents to
proof in specialist language (i.e. language normally associated with a specific
formal context or topic, such as education, business, legal, medical, etc.) and
informal day-to-day language (i.e. language which could be found spoken on
popular radio or in informal conversations, and so on). In Halliday’s (1975)
sense, we aimed to compare the occurrences of the verb and noun referents to
proof in typical formal and informal registers.
The spoken component of the BNC consists of approximately 10 million words
split into two sections: impromptu conversational spoken English recorded
from the day-to-day life of 124 representative volunteers, and spoken English
recorded from timetabled events in various different contexts: educational (e.g.
university lectures), business (e.g. trade union talks or business meetings),
public/institutional (e.g. parliamentary proceedings) and leisure (e.g. sports
commentaries). We formed a Specialist Language category by grouping the
educational, business and public/institutional context domains, and an Infor-
mal Language category by grouping the conversational component and the
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Table 1
Frequency of noun and verb forms of proof in the spoken component of the BNC,
by the language-type of the source.
Noun Verb
Specialist Language 121 (54%) 105 (46%)
Informal Language 51 (35%) 95 (65%)
leisure context domain.
Table 1 shows the frequency of the noun and verb referents in the spoken com-
ponent of the BNC, separated by the language-type of the source document
(specialist or informal, defined as described above). 2 The noun form was found
significantly more often in specialist language (54% of occurrences of proof in
specialist language were of the noun form) compared to informal language
(where 35% of occurrences were of the noun form), χ2(1) = 12.355, p < .001. 3
Importantly, this disproportionate occurrence of the noun form of proof in
specialist language does not merely reflect an overall overabundance of nouns
in formal contexts. In fact, nouns tend to be slightly less common than average
in specialist language (Hudson, 1994).
These data indicate that in spoken natural language the noun form tends to
be most often found in specialist, formal registers. In contrast, the verb form
is most often found in non-specialist informal registers. Our goal in this paper
is to investigate whether these different patterns of use influence how learners
engage with the terms “proof” and “prove” in the mathematical register.
In other words, is the way that students engage with mathematical proof
influenced by semantic contamination?
Before reporting our empirical work regarding this issue, we first situate the
paper within existing literature on proof. Specifically, we review evidence that
students (at both school and university levels) have two simultaneous and
contradictory conceptions of proof which can cause conflict in the learning of
mathematics.
2 This word frequency analysis included several unusual meanings of “proof” and
“prove” (for example “proof” can refer to the aeration of dough by a raising agent
before baking). Because semantic contamination refers to how the ways in which a
word is used in natural language influences how it is understood in the mathematical
register, we did not attempt to remove any such atypical uses (which could have
an impact upon the nature of any semantic contamination into the mathematical
register) from the sample.
3 An equivalent analysis on the written component of the BNC revealed a similar
pattern of results.
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3 Two aspects of proof: conviction and validity.
The importance of knowing about students’ conceptions of proof was pointed
out by Bell (1976) as part of his investigation into school-children’s mathe-
matical explanations. Bell suggested that proof serves multiple purposes in the
discipline of mathematics, and that a student is unlikely to produce the type
of argument required by his or her teacher unless they agree on which pur-
pose the to-be-produced argument must satisfy. Such considerations may well
account for the robust finding that students at all levels often make favorable
judgements about empirical arguments (the checking of a number of examples)
during argument evaluation tasks (e.g. Harel and Sowder 1998; Knuth 2002).
Although such arguments are often seen as being very convincing, they are
typically perceived as being invalid. There is now clear evidence that students
can independently consider both these purposes of proof during evaluation
tasks.
As different researchers have used subtly different terminology to refer to sim-
ilar phenomena, we will make explicit the terms used in this paper (which are
consistent with those used by Segal 1999). An argument is seen as convincing
if it, or some translation of it, raises the reader’s level of belief in its conclusion
above some given threshold. In contrast, an argument is seen as valid if the
reader believes that it meets the agreed criteria set down by the mathematical
community; typically this would involve accurate logic and being based on ap-
propriate premises (the prototypical example would be a deductive argument).
We recognize that conviction and validity may be linked for a particular ar-
gument. For example an argument may be convincing by virtue of its validity.
Similarly an argument may be convincing because the reader sees that some
transformation of it would be valid, even if it itself is not. However, arguments
do exist which are usually viewed by mathematicians as being convincing and
invalid, where no obvious translation of the argument is valid; see, for exam-
ple empirical arguments related to the Riemann Hypothesis (Borwein et al.
2008, chpt. 4), or visual arguments which are far removed from their formal
counterparts (Nelsen, 1997).
In a study of the proof conceptions of university students, Segal (1999) in-
vestigated first-year undergraduates conceptions of proof. She operationalized
the notion of conviction by asking students to read a series of mathematical
arguments and select for each one either “this convinces me of the result”,
or “this does not convince me of the result”. Further instructions emphasized
the nature of the judgement Segal was asking her participants to make: “you
are asked to decide whether you personally find the argument convincing”
(p. 198, emphasis in the original). The notion of validity was operationalized
in an analogous fashion: students read the instruction “a proof is an argument
by which one persuades one’s enemies (as opposed to one’s friends, or one-
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self)” (p. 199, emphasis in the original), and then were asked to select either
“this proves the result” or “this does not prove the result” for each argument.
Segal (1999) found that students’ responses to each of these questions de-
pended on the type of argument they were assessing. When evaluating empir-
ical arguments, many students seemed to make their judgements about con-
viction and validity using different criteria. Midway through their first year of
undergraduate studies, over half of her sample considered each empirical argu-
ment in the study to be convincing but invalid. In contrast students tended to
reach identical judgements about how convincing and valid they found deduc-
tive arguments. One account of these findings is that students used separate
criteria for conviction and validity for both empirical and deductive arguments,
but that these judgements simply coincided for the deductive argument in the
study. That is to say that while empirical arguments rated highly for con-
viction and lowly for validity, the students saw deductive arguments as both
convincing and valid.
A similar study at school level was conducted by Healy and Hoyles (2000). In
a large-scale investigation of 14- and 15-year-old children’s argumentation and
proof behavior, Healy and Hoyles again found that students simultaneously
hold two different conceptions of proof: those which they themselves would
adopt (related to conviction), and those they believe would receive the best
mark (related to validity). For example, students for the most part selected
narrative and empirical arguments when asked to pick arguments closest to
what their own approach would be; but when asked to pick those arguments
which would get the best mark, they would predominantly choose deductive
algebraic arguments. Healy and Hoyles drew the same conclusion as Segal; that
their participants simultaneously held two different conceptions of proof, each
of which could be elicited during argument evaluation tasks using carefully
designed questions.
Given the theoretical importance of Segal’s (1999) and Healy and Hoyles’s
(2000) studies, it is worth noting that there has been surprisingly little re-
search which has investigated what factors influence whether students adopt
a conviction conception of proof or a validity conception of proof. Segal found
that asking students about personal conviction privileges conviction and ask-
ing students about persuading enemies privileges validity; but if Bell (1976)
was correct, then many of the problems students have with mathematical proof
stem from confusing the validity and conviction conceptions. But it is unclear
what factors influence which conception students adopt when they are asked
about proof with a relatively neutral question that does not clearly privilege
one conception or the other. In order to develop effective pedagogy it would
be particularly valuable to determine whether the conception students adopt
is influenced by trait variables (i.e. relatively stable individual characteristics
and beliefs of the student), by state variables (i.e. properties of the environ-
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ment that the student finds themselves in), or by some combination of the
two.
Given the two main linguistic ways of representing the concept of proof (“proof”
and “prove”), and the different conceptions of proof evoked during argument
evaluation tasks (conviction and validity), it is natural to ask whether there is
any link between these two dualities. In other words, does semantic contam-
ination from natural language influence how the words “proof” and “prove”
are understood in the mathematical register?
The BNC analysis suggests a plausible hypothesis for the nature of any pos-
sible semantic contamination effect. If such an effect did occur, we might ex-
pect the noun form (“proof”) to more often evoke the (more formal) validity
conception of proof (because of its disproportionate occurrence in formal tech-
nical registers), and the verb form (“prove”) to more often evoke the (more
personal) conviction conception of proof (because of its disproportionate oc-
currence in everyday informal registers). The main goal of the experiments
reported in the remainder of this paper was to investigate the possibility of
such a relationship.
4 Experiment 1: Can a non-proof prove?
The primary goal of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the conviction
and validity conceptions of proof are related to the two different linguistic
referents of the concept of proof. Specifically, we asked: does the noun referent
to proof privilege the validity conception, and does the verb referent privilege
the conviction conception?
To explore this issue, following Segal (1999) and Healy and Hoyles (2000),
we decided to investigate students’ responses to argument evaluation tasks.
Developing the ability of students to evaluate arguments is a key goal of math-
ematics education. Indeed, Selden and Selden (2003) suggested that evaluating
purported proofs for validity is the primary method by which many mathe-
maticians learn new mathematics. Weber (2008) argued that the activity is
also important for both students and teachers. In fact developing students’
skills at evaluating mathematics arguments is an explicit goal of most curric-
ula: the NCTM (2000) suggested that teachers should instigate a community
of inquiry by helping students to critique their classmates’ arguments (p. 346).
In short, evaluating arguments is a important mathematical activity that stu-
dents are expected to engage with. Consequently it serves as a suitable place
for testing the hypotheses derived in the preceding analysis.
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4.1 Procedure and participants.
We used the internet to gather data in order to maximize our sample size.
Although such an approach does create potential problems that need to be
carefully considered (Reips, 2002), well-designed web-based experiments have
been found to produce data that is consistent with lab-based methods (Gosling
et al., 2004; Krantz and Dalal, 2000). Following the practice adopted by Inglis
and Mejia-Ramos (2009), we recorded the IP address of each participant,
together with the time they submitted their responses. Under the assumption
that each IP address was associated with a unique individual, these data were
used to screen for possible cases of multiple submission.
Participants were 220 volunteers studying mathematics at one of twenty highly-
ranked US universities (selected from the USNews.com list of “top mathemat-
ics programs”). Each participant was recruited via an email sent by their
departmental secretary which explained the purpose of the study, and asked
them to visit the experimental website should they wish to participate. Be-
fore starting the experiment participants were asked to declare that they were
mathematics students and that they had not previously participated in the
study.
4.2 Materials.
The study followed a between-subjects design to minimize any influence of
participants’ perceptions about the purpose of the study. After having made
their declaration participants were randomly assigned to participate in either
the noun condition or the verb condition. They were then presented with a
claim-argument pair and asked either “Is the argument a proof of the claim?”
(noun condition) or “Does the argument prove the claim?” (verb condition).
Responses were recorded via a straightforward yes/no tick box form. Once
they had clicked submit, a second claim-argument pair was presented and the
same question asked.
Two different claim-argument pairs were used. The experimental claim-argument
pair was a visual argument that purportedly justified the series
∞∑
n=1
1
22n
=
1
4
+
1
16
+
1
64
+ . . . =
1
3
.
We chose the visual argument carefully. Although visual arguments in math-
ematics are epistemologically controversial (Brown, 2008; Giaquinto, 2007),
most commonly they are seen as being mathematically invalid (Folina, 1999);
8
Table 2
Frequency of responses to the visual argument about series convergence, by condi-
tion.
Yes No
Noun 53 (46%) 63 (54%)
Verb 62 (60%) 42 (40%)
and such critical views are often held by students in more extreme forms
than by mathematicians (Inglis and Mejia-Ramos, 2009). In contrast visual
arguments are often seen to be highly convincing (Knuth, 2002). The visual
argument we chose is typical in this respect. 4 Given this, we would expect
a different range of responses to this argument from those participants who
adopt the conviction conception of proof (from whom we would expect pro-
portionately more ‘yes’ responses) to those who adopt the validity conception
(from whom we would expect proportionately more ‘no’ responses).
In addition we used a filler task (an indirect argument in favor of the claim
“if n2 is divisible by 3, then n is divisible by 3”; adapted from an argument
used by Selden and Selden 2003) in order to increase the length of the study
(experience suggests that very short internet-based experiments have greater
problems with data fidelity; Reips 2002). The two claim-argument pairs are
given in full, as they appeared in the study, in the Appendix. The order in
which the two claim-argument pairs were displayed was randomized for each
participant.
4.3 Results.
Participants’ responses to the visual series argument are shown in Table 2.
Participants’ conditions did influence their responses, χ2(1) = 4.262, p = .039.
A small majority of participants in the noun condition responded ‘no’ (54%),
whereas the situation was reversed in the verb condition, where 60% responded
‘yes’.
For completeness, we also analyzed the data from the filler task, in which
participants were asked about the indirect argument. These data are shown in
Table 3. Surprisingly, there was also a significant between-conditions difference
on this argument, χ2(1) = 4.502, p = .034. Large majorities of participants in
4 Furthermore, the argument is convincing not because it can easily be translated
into a valid argument. A typical formal proof of this statement requires a careful
examination of the series’s sequence of partial sums, and selection of an appropriate
n such that the n-th partial sum is arbitrarily close to 13 . The image does not suggest
a successful way of making this selection.
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Table 3
Frequency of responses to the indirect argument about divisibility by 3, by condition.
Yes No
Noun 96 (83%) 20 (17%)
Verb 96 (92%) 8 (8%)
both conditions responded positively to the argument, but significantly fewer
participants did so in the noun condition (83%) than in the verb condition
(92%).
4.4 Discussion.
Participants’ responses to the visual argument in Experiment 1 seemed to
confirm the hypothesis generated from the BNC analysis. Those in the noun
condition most often said that they did not think that the visual argument
was a proof, as we would expect if they were biased towards evaluating the
validity of the argument. In contrast those in the verb condition most often
said that they thought that the argument did prove the claim, as we would
expect if they were biased towards evaluating how convincing the argument
was.
The data from the filler indirect argument were rather surprising, for two rea-
sons. First, the argument was adapted from one used by Selden and Selden
(2003) in their study of eight undergraduates’ proof validation behavior. Selden
and Selden found that the ability of their participants to determine that this
argument was valid was extremely limited, and initially no better than chance.
In contrast we found that a large majority (87%) of our participants rated the
proof positively. Second, if the link between noun/verb and validity/conviction
that we have proposed were the case, we would not have expected any differ-
ence in ratings between the conditions, as we would have expected that the
argument would be seen as both valid and convincing (i.e. unlike the visual
argument it would receive positive responses regardless of which conception
of proof participants adopted). In fact we found a significant difference be-
tween the two conditions. We believe that there are two reasonable ways of
accounting for this finding.
One possibility is that, despite the evidence from the BNC analysis, in fact the
distinction between the verb and noun forms of proof is not related to validity
and conviction at all, but merely to the level of evidence required for a positive
evaluation. For instance, suppose participants were only judging the validity
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of the argument, but that they did so with varying degrees of certainty. 5
Suppose further that, rather than privileging validity, the noun form of the
question instead led participants to require a comparatively higher threshold
of certainty about the validity of the argument before they would assign it
proof status. In contrast, perhaps the verb form required a comparatively
lower threshold of certainty for proof status. That is to say that the reason
for the between-conditions difference that we found may have been that the
participants were sufficiently certain about the argument’s validity for it to
pass the lower threshold engendered by the verb condition, but that they were
not sufficiently certain for it to pass the higher threshold engendered by the
noun condition.
A second possibility is that the indirect nature of the argument caused the
differences between the two conditions. The argument, purportedly in support
of the claim “if n2 is divisible by 3, then n is divisible by 3”, actually established
the claim’s contrapositive (“if n is not divisible by 3, then n2 is not divisible
by 3”) before asserting the equivalence of the claim and its contrapositive (see
Appendix). Perhaps a subset of participants in the noun condition answered
“no” to the question “is the argument a proof of the claim?” because they
saw the argument as actually being a proof of the contrapositive of the claim
(cf., Goetting 1995). Such an interpretation would not apply to participants in
the verb condition (who answered the question “does the argument prove the
claim?”) as, even if they had seen the argument as a proof of the contrapositive
of the claim rather than the claim, this would be sufficient to prove the claim.
To explore these competing accounts we conducted a second experiment.
5 Experiment 2.
The main aims of Experiment 2 were to (i) replicate the primary result of
Experiment 1 with a second argument; and (ii) to determine whether the
result from the indirect argument in Experiment 1 would also be found with
a direct argument of similar difficulty level.
5.1 Procedure, participants and materials.
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1, with the exception
of the content of two arguments. In place of the original visual argument an
5 A similar threshold account based on conviction (or indeed some linear combi-
nation of conviction and validity) could be constructed. Such accounts are inter-
changeable in terms of the predictions tested in Experiment 2.
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Table 4
Frequency of responses to the visual argument for Young’s Inequality, by condition.
Yes No
Noun 40 (31%) 88 (69%)
Verb 50 (44%) 63 (56%)
visual argument in support of Young’s Inequality was used. In place of the
indirect argument we used a direct formal argument which demonstrates that
the product of two diagonal matrices is diagonal (based on the argument used
by Segal 1999). Both arguments are given in full in the Appendix.
We chose the direct proof carefully. If the ‘certainty threshold’ account of the
data from the indirect argument was correct we would expect similar results
with the new direct proof, as the nature of the argument would not affect
the hypothesized different threshold levels associated with the noun and verb
conditions. If, in contrast, the indirect nature of the indirect argument caused
the between-conditions effect, we would expect it to be abolished on the direct
argument in Experiment 2.
Participants were 241 volunteers studying mathematics at one of twenty highly-
ranked US universities (again selected from the USNews.com list of “top math-
ematics programs”, but different to those which participated in Experiment
1). As before, participants were contacted by their departmental secretary
via email and asked to visit the experimental website should they wish to
participate.
5.2 Results.
Participants’ responses to the visual argument for Young’s Inequality are
shown in Table 4. Participants’ conditions again influenced their responses:
31% of participants in the noun condition responded ‘yes’, compared to 44%
in the verb condition, χ2(1) = 4.333, p = .037.
Responses to the direct argument are shown in Table 5. Large majorities of
participants in both conditions (91% and 90% for noun and verb conditions re-
spectively) ranked the argument favorably. The between-conditions difference
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Table 5
Frequency of responses to the direct argument about diagonal matrices, by condi-
tion.
Yes No
Noun 116 (91%) 12 (9%)
Verb 102 (90%) 11 (10%)
did not approach significance, χ2(1) = 0.009, p = .924. 6
5.3 Discussion.
Participants’ responses to the visual argument for Young’s Inequality were
broadly similar to those for the visual argument in Experiment 1. Participants
in the noun condition were less likely to rate the argument positively than
those in the verb condition. Exactly this pattern of results would be expected
if, as suggested by the BNC analysis, the verb referent to proof privileged
evaluations related to conviction and the noun referent privileged evaluations
related to validity.
The data from the direct argument are consistent with the suggestion that it
was the indirect nature of the filler-task in Experiment 1 which caused the
between-conditions difference. That is to say that a minority of participants
were of the view that the indirect argument in Experiment 1 was a proof of
the contrapositive of the claim, and not a proof of the claim itself. It is hard
to reconcile the competing ‘certainty threshold’ account with the data from
the direct argument in Experiment 2. If the noun condition made participants
require more certainty than the verb condition, we would have expected to find
a between-conditions difference, with higher numbers of participants rating the
argument positively in the verb condition compared to the noun condition. In
fact, we found a very small and non-significant trend in the opposite direction.
6 That this comparison had similar power characteristics and distance from ceiling
as the indirect proof comparison in Experiment 1, gives us increased confidence that
a Type II statistical error has been avoided. Furthermore, our results are consistent
with Segal’s (1999) study where the same argument was given similar conviction
and validity ratings by around 80% of participants. Recall that Segal used extremely
explicit task instructions to ensure participants were making conviction and validity
judgements respectively.
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6 General Discussion.
6.1 Summary of main findings.
Our main goals in this paper were to determine whether the way learners en-
gage with mathematical proof is affected by semantic contamination from nat-
ural language into the mathematical register. To accomplish this we explored
Segal’s (1999) and Healy and Hoyles’s (2000) suggestion that some students
hold two simultaneous and contradictory conceptions of mathematical proof:
conviction and validity.
To establish that semantic contamination influences student understanding of
a given concept, three steps are required. First one must analyze the natu-
ral language meanings and use of referents to the concept. Second one must
investigate how the concept is understood by students in mathematical con-
texts. Finally one must argue that the natural language use of referents to the
concept and students’ understanding of the concept in mathematical contexts
correspond sufficiently to suggest a causal relationship.
Our analysis of the word frequency of proof in natural language suggested that
the noun referent to proof is more associated with specialist formal language
than the verb referent, which disproportionately occurs in informal language.
Consequently, under the hypothesis that semantic contamination is a factor
in students’ understanding of proof, we predicted that an argument evalua-
tion task phrased using the noun form of proof (“proof”) would elicit more
responses which used the (more formal) validity conception of proof than the
identical task phrased using the verb form (“prove”). In both Experiment 1
and Experiment 2, this was indeed the case for visual arguments. Participants
in the verb conditions evaluated the arguments more favorably than those in
the noun conditions: exactly what we would expect if they were dispropor-
tionately evaluating the argument in terms of conviction rather than validity.
The filler task used in Experiment 1 revealed a surprising aspect of indirect ar-
guments. Although the large majority of participants in both conditions rated
it positively, there was a significant between-conditions difference: with those
in the noun condition more likely to give a negative rating. We have argued
that this was because a small minority of participants seemed to believe that
the argument was a proof of the contrapositive of the claim, and not a proof
of the claim itself. This is not an implausible suggestion given the confusion
some students have with indirect arguments (e.g., Goetting 1995). Responses
to the direct argument in Experiment 2, where we found no between-conditions
difference, were consistent with this account.
Although significant between-conditions differences were found for the visual
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arguments in Experiments 1 and 2, it is worth noting that the size of these
effects was relatively small, φ = 0.139 and φ = 0.134 for Experiments 1
and 2 respectively. Although previous researchers have investigated semantic
contamination in the context of mathematics, to our knowledge this is the
study of the phenomena which has used a design that permits effect sizes
to be calculated. Consequently, it is difficult to assess whether the size of the
effects we found is comparable to the size of the semantic contamination effects
in the areas of mathematics discussed by Monaghan (1991), Pimm (1987) and
Tall and Vinner (1981).
An alternative way of characterizing these effect sizes is to note that sub-
stantial numbers of participants chose “yes” and “no” in both conditions.
So, although the phrasing of the question—a state variable—did cause higher
numbers of participants to adopt either the conviction or validity conception
of proof, this factor on its own did not account for all the between-participants
variability. Whether the remaining variability can be accounted for by further
state variables related to the environment in which students took the task, or
whether trait variables related to relatively stable beliefs and conceptions of
individual students also play a part is unclear. Further research could prof-
itably look at what other factors influence students’ responses to argument
evaluation tasks.
6.2 Implications.
Several researchers have noticed that the way terms are used in natural lan-
guage can interfere with the way the same terms are understood within the
mathematical register. This phenomena, referred to as semantic contamina-
tion by Pimm (1987), can cause problems for learners. In some cases students
may fail to reason from formal concept definitions, and instead rely upon con-
cept images influenced by natural language (Halliday, 1975; Monaghan, 1991;
Tall and Vinner, 1981). To overcome this difficulty Rowland (1999) suggested
that students must be helped to appropriate the technical language of the
mathematical register into their own classroom discourse.
However, the case of mathematical proof seems to be somewhat different to
the limit and continuity concepts discussed by Monaghan (1991) and Tall
and Vinner (1981), as it does not have an agreed concept definition. In fact
characterizing the nature of proof is a difficult and current topic in the phi-
losophy literature. Some mathematicians have tried to remove considerations
of conviction entirely, by characterizing proof as a sequence of formulae each
of which either follows from previous formulae, or is an axiom (Hilbert, 1930);
others have suggested that any convincing argument is a proof (Bundy et al.,
2005). Others too, have argued that what is a proof depends on whether one
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is (or is being at the time) an applied mathematician, a pure mathematician
or a computer scientist (Swinnerton-Dyer, 2005). Proof, then, would seem to
be an unusual case of a technical term from the mathematical register with
no clearly agreed concept definition.
One implication of this lack of an agreed meaning is that it seems very difficult
to know whether or not we, as educators, should regard it as undesirable that
students responded to the noun and verb forms of proof differently in the
argument evaluation tasks reported in this paper. Without a clear reference
from expert practice to guide our understanding of the mathematical register,
it may be difficult to apply Rowland’s (1999) suggestion and help our students
appropriate the ‘correct’ meanings of the words “proof” and “prove”.
Although it may be difficult to follow Rowland’s (1999) suggestion in the con-
text of proof, these findings do nevertheless have important implications for
practice and theory. In particular Tall and Vinner’s (1981) constructs of con-
cept image and concept definition highlight to teachers the possibility that
their students may be interpreting mathematical terms used in instruction
differently to intended. For example, Monaghan (1991) showed that when lec-
turers refer to a sequence approaching a limit, students may believe that it
must do so from only one side. In other words, an awareness of semantic con-
tamination is important for real analysis lecturers as it highlights the possible
communication breakdowns that may occur in their lectures. Similarly, the
suggestion that semantic contamination occurs in the context of proof allows
us, as teachers, to be aware of the conceptions of proof that we may be unin-
tentionally evoking by our use of these terms in educational situations.
Along with practical implications, we believe that our findings have theoretical
and methodological significance. Stylianides and Stylianides (2009) suggested
that prospective student teachers sometimes construct empirical arguments
in response to proof tasks, despite apparently regarding these very same self-
produced arguments as invalid. Consequently, they argued that in order to gain
a holistic picture of students’ understanding of proof, researchers should use
both evaluation and construction tasks. Our findings are consistent with the
observation that it may be methodologically flawed to draw strong conclusions
about an individuals’ understanding of proof from responses to a single task.
Indeed, we can go further, by saying that individuals may not even exhibit
a stable single conception of proof across very similar argument evaluation
tasks. As we randomly allocated our participants into conditions, our research
design permits us to conclude that there is a causal relationship between the
phrasing of argument evaluation task instructions and the types of responses
that students give to them. That an apparently irrelevant linguistic change
can influence participants’ responses to standard argument evaluation tasks
suggests that it may be unwise for educational theories to attribute stable
mental constructs and beliefs to students in the domain of proof. In other
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words, it may be unwise to attempt to account for student behavior by con-
sidering trait variables only. We have shown that a seemingly innocuous state
variable—whether the question uses a noun or a verb referent to proof—also
influences student behavior. Future research could profitably investigate how
state and trait variables interact in tasks related to mathematical proof.
Our empirical work here has concentrated on argument evaluation tasks: our
participants were given arguments and asked to assess them. As discussed
earlier in the paper, such evaluation activities are recognized as being central
to providing students with an authentic mathematical experience and to de-
veloping their notions of argumentation and proof (NCTM, 2000; Selden and
Selden, 2003; Weber, 2008). Nevertheless there are other important activities
related to proof. In particular, in educational settings students are also often
asked to construct valid mathematical arguments, and students often pro-
duce convincing but non-valid arguments in response to such tasks (Harel and
Sowder, 1998; Recio and Godino, 2001). Does semantic contamination also
influence student behavior in such settings? Would students be more likely
to produce convincing but non-valid arguments if asked to prove a statement
than if asked to write a proof of a statement? Given semantic contamination
seems to influence behavior in argument evaluation tasks it seems reasonable
to hypothesize that it would also influence behavior in argument construction
tasks; but it will be for future research to test this hypothesis.
7 Conclusions.
We have demonstrated that whether an argument evaluation task uses the
noun or verb referent to mathematical proof influences how students respond
to it. We have accounted for this finding by proposing that semantic contami-
nation between natural language and the mathematical register impacts upon
how students engage with mathematical proof; that the conviction and validity
conceptions of proof can be preferentially elicited by making an apparently in-
nocuous linguistic change to task instructions. The noun referent seems to cue
participants into evaluating arguments on validity grounds, whereas the verb
referent cues participants into using conviction as a basis for their evaluations.
In short, a non-proof can, in some cases, prove.
As well as increasing our understanding about the range of learning situations
in which semantic contamination plays a role, these results have important
implications for the significance of the observation that some students simul-
taneously hold two different conceptions of proof. They indicate one factor
which influences which conception students adopt at any given time. Balacheff
(2008) suggested that proof has several different meanings in the mathemat-
ics education literature, and pointed out that this could be a hindrance for
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research progress. The same point may be true for individual students and
their mathematical progress. Understanding that different conceptions can
be unintentionally elicited by the different linguistic choices made by teach-
ers, lecturers and curriculum designers is surely a necessary prerequisite for
helping our students successfully coordinate the various different aspects of
mathematical proof.
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A Arguments used in Experiment 1.
A.1 The visual series argument.
Claim.
∑∞
n=1
1
22n
= 1
4
+ 1
16
+ 1
64
+ . . . = 1
3
.
Argument. [Figure A.1].
A.2 The indirect argument.
Claim. For any positive integer n, if n2 is divisible by 3, then n is divisible by
3.
Argument. We will show that the contrapositive of this statement is correct,
i.e. that if n is not a multiple of 3, then n2 is not a multiple of 3. So, as we are
assuming that n is not a multiple of 3, we know that n = 3k+ 1 or n = 3k+ 2
for some k ∈ Z. We will consider each case in turn. Suppose n = 3k + 1, then
n2 = (3k+1)2 = 9k2+6k+1 = 3(3k2+2k)+1, which is not a multiple of 3. Now
we consider the second case: n2 = (3k+2)2 = 9k2+12k+4 = 3(3k2+4k+1)+1,
which is not a multiple of 3. So, in both cases n2 is not a multiple of 3, and
we have established the contrapositive, which is equivalent to the original
statement.
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B Arguments used in Experiment 2.
B.1 The direct argument.
Claim. The product of diagonal matrices is diagonal.
Argument. Let A = (aij)n×n and B = (bij)n×n be two diagonal matrices of size
n× n. Let C = AB. Then
cij =
n∑
k=1
aikbkj = ai1b1j + ai2b2j + . . .+ ainbnj
...
...
...
1
1
1/8
1/81/4
1/4
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/4
1/4
Fig. A.1. The visual argument for the claim
∑∞
n=1
1
22n
= 13 .
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Since A is diagonal then aik = 0 whenever i 6= k. Therefore cij = aiibij. Since
B is diagonal, bij = 0 whenever i 6= j. Therefore, cij = 0 whenever i 6= j. Thus
C is diagonal.
B.2 The visual Young’s argument.
Claim. Let φ and ψ be two continuous, strictly increasing functions. Suppose
φ = ψ−1 and φ(0) = ψ(0) = 0. Then, for a, b ≥ 0, we have:
ab ≤
a∫
0
φ(x) dx+
b∫
0
ψ(y) dy
with equality if and only if b = φ(a).
Argument. [Figure B.1].
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Fig. B.1. The visual argument for Young’s inequality.
22
